In highly-scalable storage systems for Web services, data is sharded into separate objects, also called shards, across several servers. Transaction isolation, while reading the objects, is at the heart of consistent data access when concurrent updates are present. In practice, systems experience a much higher number of read transactions, consisting only of read operations, compared to write transactions; consequently, lowering latency of read transactions boosts service performance. In [9] , the authors proposed four desirable properties in transaction processing systems for achieving low-latency of read transactions, with asynchronous and reliable communications, and referred to them collectively as the SNOW properties: The underlying properties, in the context of an execution, are (i) strict serializability (S) property where read and write transactions seem to occur atomically; (ii) non-blocking (N) property implies that for every read operation on any object, during a read transaction, the response at the corresponding server is non-blocking; (iii) one version and one round (O) property implies every read operation, during a read transaction, completes in one-round of client-server communication and the respective server responds with only one version of the object value; and (iv) concurrent write transactions (W) property states that read transactions can have concurrent write transactions. Then they argued that it is impossible to implement all the four properties, in the same system, even with at least three clients. They referred to their result as the SNOW theorem, and they posed the two-client setting as an open question.
Introduction
Most highly accessed websites rely on large volumes of data in the back end. Scalability of these websites is dependent on the ability to serve thousands of web-requests per second. Although it is desirable to store all of this data at a single server, due to limited resources available on a single machine it is impossible to do so. Therefore, such data is partitioned and stored across multiple machines connected through high-speed networks. Subsequently, serving one webpage request may involve retrieving various data objects of the page from multiple servers. These individual data objects are often referred to as shards or objects, where each object is managed by a separate server. For example, a dynamically generated webpage may contain various objects, such as texts, images, and videos: the text elements may be stored in one server, the images and thumbnails in another, and, similarly, the video clips may be managed by a separate server. During the webpage synthesis and loading, the proxy reader reads all of these separate objects via a read transaction. Some of these objects may be updated while read transactions are carried out. A transaction consists of a set of read or write operations on the underlying objects which are to be executed atomically.
In our work, we consider two types of transactions: write transactions and read transactions. A read transaction consists of a set of read operations, one per each object, and a write transaction comprises of a set of individual write operations on a subset of the objects. Consistent data access during a transactional read requires transactional isolation, where reads to different objects must retrieve either all updates for a given update or none. Similar transactional isolation of write transactions is also desirable, where the collection of all the write operations to different objects is carried out atomically. Handling transactional isolation with concurrent read and write transactions is complex and expensive which may often lead to poor performance and lower throughput, which in turn leads to substantial revenue loss and poor user experience. In practice, it is observed that most of the transactions are read transactions, and therefore, one approach to boost performance is to improve the performance of the read transactions [3] .
In [9] , the authors study the question whether read transactions can be fast enough even in the presence of concurrent write transactions. They introduce four desirable properties of a system to achieve low-latency read transactions, which they refer to collectively as the SNOW property: Strict serializability among transactions, Non-blocking operations and One-response from each shard for the read transactions, and compatibility with conflicting Write transactions. The "strict serializability" property requires that the set of read or writer operations of any read and write transactions is executed atomically as if executed by a single server. "Non-blocking" requires the read requests corresponding to different objects to be served by the managing servers immediately, without blocking for any other external input or output messages. The "one-response" property requires that for any read operation of an object, the server managing the object responds with only one version, and the operation completes in one round of client to server communication. The final property "conflicting and concurrent write transactions" allows write transactions to execute concurrently with read transactions on the same set of objects.
In distributed systems, the availability of the systems is often stated in terms of liveness properties of the transactions or operations [5, 6, 12] . Such a requirement on responsiveness of a system is also referred to as availability. One of the strongest, and the most desirable of these properties is wait-freedom, which requires that as long as the client is taking a sufficient number of steps, it completes the operations irrespective of the speed of other clients. In [9] , the wait-free property of the read operations, corresponding to a read transaction in a system that satisfies SNOW properties, is inherent in the N and O properties; this also implies the wait-freedom property for read transactions. However, in [9] , no liveness property for write transactions is stated explicitly. In their work, the authors prove that with at least three clients, in an asynchronous message-passing environment, even in the absence of any failures, it is impossible to have a protocol that satisfies all of the four properties of SNOW, which they refer to as the SNOW theorem. In their proof, they consider a system with two read clients, which issues only read transactions, and a write client invoking write transactions. From their proof, it is not clear whether they consider the possibility of exchanging messages between clients. Additionally, there is no explicitly stated requirement on the liveness of the write transactions. They pose the case for two clients as an unresolved case, i.e., it is not known whether all of SNOW properties can be implemented for any two client system.
Our contribution In this work, we revisit the results of the SNOW theorem and present four new results. First, we show that even with two clients, in the absence of client-to-client messaging, it is impossible to design a transaction processing system which satisfies the SNOW properties. Second, we provide a thorough proof of the SNOW theorem for systems with at least three clients, i.e., we show that it is impossible to implement a transaction processing system, which can implement the SNOW property, consisting of at least three clients, even with client-to-client messaging. In our proof, we explicitly make assumptions regarding the liveness of write transactions and client-toclient messaging. Our proof technique involves assuming an execution of an arbitrary transaction processing system, assumed to be specified as an I/O automaton, that satisfies the SNOW property, and then, argue by constructing a sequence of executions of the automata, finally, leading to an execution which contradicts the S property. The above two results indicate that client-to-client messaging ability plays a key role in the achievability of the SNOW property. This motivates our third result, where we present an algorithm with multiple writers, single reader (MWSR) which satisfies the SNOW properties when client-to-client messaging is allowed. Finally, we present an algorithm, for multiple-writer, multiple-reader (MWMR) setting in the absence of client-to-client messaging, which satisfies the "S", "N", "W" properties and and a weaker version the O property, which we denote by "o", where "o" refers to the one-version property of a read operation, but can take multiple rounds of communication to complete the read operation. Collectively, we refer to the "S", "N", "o" and "W" properties as the "SNoW" property.
Related work This will be filled in depending what type of conference we send the paper to and whether we add some experimental results of the two algorithms presented in the paper.
Document Structure
The remainder of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the models and definitions. Section 3, provides the proof for the impossibility result for the two-client setting when clients do not communicate among each other. In section 3, we present the impossibility result for the three-client setting. Next, in section 6 we present the algorithm with multi-writer, single-reader (MWSR) which satisfies the SNOW properties, when client-to-client communication is allowed. In section 7, we present an algorithm for multi-writer, multi-reader scenario which satisfies the SNoW properties.
2 System model and architecture
I/O Automata
We consider a distributed system consisting of asynchronous processes of three types: a set of readers and writers, called clients, and a set of servers. Each of these processes is associated with an unique identifier. Processes can communicate via asynchronous reliable communication links. This means that any message sent on the link is guaranteed to eventually reach the destination process. The model assumes that client or server processes never fail. We do not make any assumption regarding the order of message delivery in the same channel.
We assume that the formal specification of an algorithm in our context is specified using the I/O Automata. An algorithm is specified from the composition A of a set of automata where each automaton A i corresponds to a process i in the system. An automaton A i consists of a set of states states(A i ) , including a special subset start(A i ) ⊆ states(A) called the start states ; a signature, denoted sig(A i ); and a set of transitions trans(A i ). The set of states states(A i ) are essentially defined by a set of state variables in A i . The signature sig(A i ) consists of three disjoint sets in in(A i ), out(A i ) and int(A i ), where in(A i ) referred to as the input actions, out(A i ) the output actions and int(A i ) are the internal actions. The set trans(A i ) consists of the set of transitions or steps, where each step consists of a 3-tuple (σ i , a i , σ i+1 ), where σ i , σ i+1 ∈ states(A i ) and a i ∈ trans(A i ). The set in(A i ) ∪ out(A i ), often denoted as ext(A i ), are called the external signature of automaton A i . Note that A is a composition of the set of automata A i , i ∈ I and the following analogous components for A are defined as states(A) i∈I states(
Informally, the execution of the algorithm corresponds to the concept of the execution of A. First, an execution fragment α of A is a finite or infinite sequence σ 0 , a 1 , σ 1 , a 2 , σ 2 , . . ., where each σ i belong to states(A) and a i belongs to trans(A). An execution of A is an execution fragment such that σ 0 ∈ start(A). We use the notation trace(α) to denote the sequence of external actions in α; and by trace(α)|A i to denote the sequence of external actions in trace(α) that belongs to automaton A i . If α is a finite execution and β is an execution fragment, such that, β starts with the final state of α then we use the symbol α • β to denote execution fragment obtained as a result of concatenation of execution fragments α and β. The set of locally controller actions in an automaton can be partitioned into tasks. Moreover, in the case of an execution, if the execution is infinite and events from each class occurs infinitely often, and if the execution is finite and if none of the events from any of the classes is enabled then the execution is called fair. If and are two execution fragments such that at some automaton A they are the same, i.e., |A = |A, then we use the notation A ∼ . When the automaton is clear from the context, for the sake of brevity we drop the symbol for the automaton over the ∼. Below we add some useful theorems are useful related to executions of a composed I/O Automata [10] . Theorem 2.1. Let {A i } i∈I be a compatible collection of automata and let A = Π i∈I A i . Suppose α i is an execution of A i for every i ∈ I, and suppose β is a sequence of actions in ext(A) such that β|A i = trace(α i ) for every i ∈ I. Then there is an execution α of A such that β = trace(α) and α i = α|A, for every i ∈ I. Theorem 2.2. Let A be any I/O automaton.
1. If α is a finite execution of A, then there is a fair execution of A that starts with α.
2. If β is a finite trace of A, then there is a fair trace of A that starts with β.
3. If α is a finite execution of A and β is any finite or infinite sequence of input actions of A, then there is a fair execution α • α of A such that the sequence of input actions in α is exactly β.
4. If β is a finite trace of A and β is any finite or infinite sequence of input actions of A, then there is a fair execution α • α of A such that trace(α) = β and such that the sequence of input actions in α is exactly β .
The following useful claim is adopted from Chapter 16 of [10] .
Claim 1. Suppose we have an automaton
where A is composed of the compatible collection of automata A i , where i ∈ {1, · · · , k}. Let β be a fair trace of A then we define an irreflexive partial order → β on the actions of β as follows. If π and φ are events in β, with π preceding φ, then we say φ depends on π, which we denote as π → β φ, if one of the following holds:
1. π and φ are actions at the same automaton;
2. π is some send(·) j,i at some A j and φ is some recv(·) j,i at A i ; and 3. π and φ are related by a chain of the relations of items 1. and 2.
Then if γ is a sequence obtained by reordering the events in β while preserving the → β , then γ is also a fair trace of A. Theorem 2.3. Let {A i } i∈I be a compatible collection of automata and let A = Π k i=1 A i . Suppose α i is a fair execution of A i for every i ∈ I, and suppose β is a sequence of actions in ext(A) such that β|A i = trace(α i ) for every i ∈ I. Then there is a fair execution α of A such that β = trace(α) and α i = α|A for every i ∈ I.
Data type
In this section, we formally describe the data type, which we denote as O T , for the transaction processing systems considered in this paper. We assume there is a set of k objects, where k is some positive integer, and o k denotes the k th object. Object o k stores a value from some non-empty domain V k and supports two types of operations: read and write operations. A read operation on object o k , denoted by read(o k ), on completion returns the value stored in o k . A write operation on o k with some value v k from V k , denoted as write(o k , v k ), on completion, updates the value of o k .
A write transaction consists of a subset of p distinct write operations for a subset of p distinct objects, where 1 ≤ p ≤ k. For example, a write transaction with the set of operations
means value v i 1 is to be written to object o i 1 , value v i 2 to object o i 2 , and so on. We denote such a write transaction as
A read transaction consisting of a set of read operations is denoted as
iq is a set of distinct objects, q is any positive integer, 1 ≤ q ≤ k, which upon completion returns the values (
Formally, we define the value type used in this paper for a k object data-type as follows: ok; and (v) for any subset of p objects we define f : invocations × V → responses × V , such that:
where for any i, w i = u i if i ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i p }, and for all other values of i, w i = v i . Figure 1 : The architecture of a typical web service with clients and servers inside a datacenter.
System Model
In our system, we assume there are writers, for some ≥ 1; m readers, for some m ≥ 1, and k servers for some k ≥ 1. We denote the set of writers as W, which essentially consists of the writer identifiers w 1 , w 2 · · · w . The set of readers, with ids r 1 , r 2 · · · r m , is denoted as R. The set of servers S consists of the server identifiers s 1 , s 2 · · · s k . The servers s 1 , s 2 · · · s k manage the objects o 1 , o 2 , · · · , o k , respectively, in particular, server s i is responsible for storing object o i , for any i, Communications between processes during the executions are point-to-point and are assumed to be reliable and asynchronous. The communications are modeled with Channel I/O automata and are carried out via send and recv actions at the source and destination processes. For example, in Figure 2 , the reader r 1 automaton sends, via the action send(m), some message m, from some alphabet M, to server s 1 through the channel automaton Channel r 1 ,s 1 , and s 1 receives it though the action recv(m). Similarly, the message m , m ∈ M, is transmitted from s 1 to r 1 , through the channel automaton Channel s 1 ,r 1 , via the actions send(m ) at s 1 , and finally received at r 1 via the action recv(m ).
The schematic flow of a typical, but simplified, webpage request from a service hosted in a datacenter is shown in Figure 1 . An end user sends a webpage request to a front-end client r 1 . Upon receiving it r 1 generates a read transaction R, which consists of a set of read operations and is invoked via a IN V (R) action at the client, which is essentially input to the client from the end user. The goal of these operations is to read a subset of the data objects by contacting the respective managing servers. The operations in a transaction are carried out between the invocation and response actions of the transaction without any particular order of execution among the operations. Any operation op begins with an invocation action, inv(op), at the relevant client, and ends with a response action resp(op), also at the client. Once the front-end client completes the read operations, then r 1 synthesizes the webpage with the data retrieved by the read operations, and responds to the end user request through the response action RESP (R) at the client r 1 . 1 Similarly, the update request from the end user can be thought of a write transaction W , consisting of a set of write operations for individual objects, to update the set of object values, initiated via an invocation action IN V (W ) at the client. Then the writes operations are carried out by the client, and once they complete, the transaction completes with the response action RESP (W ), at the client.
A transaction π is incomplete in an execution α when the action IN V (π) does not have the RESP (π) in α; otherwise, we say that π is complete in α. In an execution, we say that a transaction (read or write) π 1 precedes another transaction π 2 (denote as π 1 → π 2 ), if the response action RESP (π 1 ) precedes the invocation action IN V (π 2 ). Two transactions are concurrent if neither precedes the other.
If in any execution of the system every client initiates a new transaction only after the previous transactions initiated at the same client have completed, then we say the execution is well-formed.
SNOW Properties
The SNOW properties for a transaction processing system can be described by requiring that any fair execution of the system satisfies the following four properties: (i) Strict Serializability (S), which means there is a total ordering of the transactions such that the resulting execution seems to occur at a single machine atomically; (ii) Non-Blocking Operations (N) property, which means that the servers respond immediately, without waiting for any input from other processes, to read requests for the read operations, which belong to the read transactions; (iii) One Response Per Read (O) property requires that any read operation consists of one-round trip of communication with a server, and also, the server responds with a message that contains exactly one version of the object value; and (iv) write transactions that Conflict (W) implies the existence of concurrent write transactions that update the data objects while read transactions are in progress. Below we describe the individual properties of the SNOW properties in more detail.
Strict serializability By strict serializability [7] , we mean each write or read transaction is executed atomically, at some point in an execution between the invocation and response events. In other words, for each transaction, we can associate a serialization point between the invocation and response actions, such that all the read operations return values that are consistent with the ordering of the serialization points.
Non-blocking reads Consider a read transaction initiated by a read client r and a read operation in it to read the value of an object o i managed by some server s i . The read operation involves r communicating a send value message to s i requesting the stored value of o i . The non-blocking property means that the server responds to the read request without waiting for any external input event, such as the arrival of messages, any mutex operations, time, etc. This property ensures that read transactions are delayed only due to delay of messages between r and s i . Below we define the non-blocking nature of any server's response to a read request from a reader as follows. Definition 1. If α is a fair execution of some server automaton for a server s and action recv(m r ) r,s appears in α, where r is a reader automaton and m r is a read value request to server s, and no other input actions follow recv(m r ) r,s , then eventually, the action send(v i ) s,r occurs in α.
One-response read operations The one-response property requires that each read operation, during any read transaction, completes in one round of client to server communication and receives exactly one version of the object value from the corresponding server. A round consists of a read request from the client initiating the read operation to the server, and subsequently, the server sending only one version of the object value in its response. The one-round property is imposed to reduce the number of messages between the client and the server during a read operation, and hence reducing the latency of the read transaction. The one-version property is added to reduce the amount of data transmitted during the read operation and hence reduce latency of read operations, which also means lowering latency for the read transaction.
Concurrent and conflicting writes The conflicting, or concurrent writes property states that read transactions complete even in the presence of concurrent write transactions, where the write operations might update some objects that are also being read by read operations in read. This shows that read transactions can be invoked at any point, even in the presence of ongoing write transactions. Note that the liveness of any write transaction is not implied by any of the SNOW properties; however, for useful practical systems the writes must eventually complete. Therefore, we assume that every write transaction eventually completes via the RESP event, and think of this constraint as a part of the W property.
The SNOW Theorem [9] The theorem states that no read-only transaction algorithm provides all of the SNOW properties.
One-version property
Motivated by the impossibility result of the SNOW theorem, we propose in Section 7, an algorithm for transaction processing systems under constraints weaker than the SNOW properties. With this in mind, we introduce a weaker version of the O property, denote it as "o", where during a read operation the server returns exactly one object value but there exists a finite bound on the number of rounds of communication between the client and the server. We use the acronym SNoW to denote the S, N, o and W properties. Moreover, it is easy to realize that if an algorithm satisfies the SNoW properties then read transactions always complete, and hence, read's are always live. This is because the N and o properties imply that the server must immediately respond to a read request due to a read operation with exactly one object value without waiting in expectation of incoming messages, and there a fixed upper bound on the number of such rounds for a read.
3 Impossibility of SNOW properties with two clients with restricted communication
In this section, we prove that for a two-client transaction processing system with at least two objects it is impossible to design an algorithm that satisfies the SNOW properties.We prove our result by showing a contradiction. For the model consider in this section, we assume that between every pair of client and server, or every pair of servers there are two communication channels, one in each direction; however, there are no communication channels between any pair of clients Fig 2. Consider a system consisting of two servers, s 1 and s 2 , and two clients, a reader r, which initiates only read transactions, and a writer w, which initiates only write transactions. ), respectively. We assume that the patterns of sequences of invocations of transaction, the times of these invocations, and delays in local computation and message deliveries, are controlled by an omniscient entity. which we refer to as the adversary. The assumption of such an adversary is in accordance with the asynchronous nature of the model. This is also important in real systems, because such executions are possible to occur and thus important for making the system safe.
Notations and Definitions:
We introduce the following notations and definitions in the context of an execution , of A, with transactions R and W in it, where j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. send(m r j ) r,s j : an output action at r A , which sends a message m r j from reader r to server s j , requesting the value for o j ; 2. recv(m r j ) r,s j : an input action at s A j , that receives the message m r j , sent from r;
3. send(v j ) s j ,r : an output action at s A j , that sends value v j , for o j , to r.
4. recv(v j ) s j ,r : an input action at r A , to receive a message v j from s j at r A .
5. Non-blocking fragments F i ( ), i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose there is a fragment of execution in where the first action is recv(m r i ) r,s i and the last action is send(v i ) s i ,r , both of which occur at s A i . Moreover, suppose there is no other input action at s A i in this fragment. Then we call this execution fragment a non-blocking response fragment for op r i at s A i . We use the notation F i ( ) to denote this fragment of execution of . 6. We use the notations R( ) and W ( ) to denote the transactions R and W , in . When the underlying execution is clear from the context we simply use R and W .
7. If the non-blocking fragment F 1 ( ) appears in such that recv(m r 2 ) r,s 2 , at s A 2 , does not occur before F 1 ( ) completes and is of the form σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a , σ • F 1 ( ) • S( ), where S( ) is any continuation of the execution, then we denote σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a , σ by P ( ).
If is of the form
where is a positive integer, κ is a segment of , possibly even of length zero and S( ) is any suffix part of the execution then we denote σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a , σ by P ( ). Clearly, we can write as
Now we describe the set of actions corresponding to the read transactions in a fair execution of A. Clearly, in , the actions inv(op r i ) and resp(op r i ) appear between the actions IN V (R) and RESP (R). The action inv(op r i ) is followed by action send(m r i ) r,s i , which is for sending the read object value request to server s i . This request m r i is communicated to s i , via the channel automaton Channel r,s i . Automaton s A i eventually receives the request via the action recv(m r i ) r,s i , and subsequently, responds back to r, with object value v i , through the action send(v i ) s i ,r . Next, value v i , v i ∈ V i , communicated by the automaton Channel s i ,r , is received at r via the action recv(v i ) s i ,r , and finally, op r i completes with response action resp(op r i ) and returns v i to r A . Here, we give a high-level idea of our proof, which is based on the existence of a sequence of fair executions of A, eventually leading to a execution of A that contradicts the S property. First, we show the existence of an execution α of A where R is invoked after W completes, where the send actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 at the r A , occur consecutively, in P (α). Then we show α can be written in the form P (α) • F 1 (α) (Figure 3 (a), Lemma 3.1). Based on α, we show the existence of another execution β, of A, which can be written in the form Figure 3 (b) ; Lemma 3.2) . Note that in any arbitrary extension (as a fair execution) of β, eventually R returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Next, from β, we show the existence of an execution γ, of A, of the form
, where the send actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 at r A , occur before W is invoked ( Figure 3 (c); Lemma 3.3), but the fragments F 1 (γ) and F 2 (γ) occur after RESP (W ), as in β. From γ we show the existence of a fair execution δ, of A, of the form
. Finally, starting with η we create a sequence of fair executions δ(≡ η), δ (1) , · · · δ (f ) , of A, where in each of them R responds with (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) (Figure 4 (e) and (g); Lemma 3.6). Additionally, for any δ (i) , the fragments F 1 (δ (i) ) and F 2 (δ (i) ) appear in the execution before δ (i−1) . From δ (f ) we show the existence of a fair execution φ (see Figure 4 (h)), of A, where R completes by returning (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) even before W begins, which is violation of the property S. Now, we state and prove the the relevant lemmas. The following lemma states that there is a finite execution of A where R begins after W completes where the two send actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 occur before either of the servers s 1 and s 2 receives the messages m r 1 or m r 2 from r; also, server s 1 responds to r in a non-blocking manner (execution α in Figure 3 (a)).
Lemma 3.1. There exists a finite execution α of A that contains transactions R(α) and W (α) where IN V (R) appears after RESP (W ) and the following conditions hold:
The actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 appear consecutively in trace(α)|r A ; and
Proof. Consider a finite execution fragment of A with a completed transaction W , where after W completes the adversary invokes R, i.e., IN V (R) occurs. Note that each of the read operations op r 1 and op r 2 , in R, can be invoked by the adversary at any point in the execution. Following IN V (R), the adversary introduces the invocation action inv(op r 1 ); by the O property of the read operations of A the action send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 eventually occurs. Next, the adversary introduces inv(op r 2 ) and also, delays the arrival of m r 1 until action send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 eventually occurs, which must occur in accordance with the property O of read operations. Let us call this finite execution α 0 .
Next, suppose at the end of α 0 the adversary delivers the message m r 1 , which has been delayed so far, via the action recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 , at s A 1 , but it delays any other input actions at s A 1 . Note that by the N property of read operations s A 1 eventually responds with send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r , with one value v 1 by O property, where v 1 = v 1 1 by the S property, since R begins after W completes. Let us call this execution α. Note that α satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) by the design of the execution.
The following lemma states that there is an execution β of A where R begins after W completes where the two send events at r A occurs before F 1 (β), which in turn, occurs before F 2 (β) (execution β in Figure 3 (b) ).
Lemma 3.2. There exists an execution β of A that contains transactions R and W where IN V (R) appears after RESP (W ) and the following conditions hold:
(i) The actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 appear consecutively in trace(β)|r A ; and
Proof. Consider the execution α of A as constructed in Lemma 3.1. At the end of the execution fragment α, the adversary delivers the previously delayed message m r 2 , which is sent via the action send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 , by introducing the action recv(m r 2 ) r,s 2 . The adversary then delays any other input action in A. By the N property, server s A 2 must respond to r A , with some value v 2 , and hence the output action send(v 2 ) s 2 ,r must eventually occur at s A 2 . Let us call this finite execution as β. Note that β satisfies the properties (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma.
The following result shows that starting with β there is an execution γ of A where R is initiated before W is initiated , also, the send events send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 occur before IN V (W ) (execution Figure 3 (c) ) and the messages m r 1 and m r 2 from r A reach the servers s 1 and s 2 , respectively, after the action RESP (W ). (ii) γ contains the execution fragment
Proof. Consider the execution β of A as in Lemma 3.2. Note that β is an execution of the composed automaton A (≡ S A 1 × r A ). In β, the actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 occur at r A ; and following that, the actions recv(m r
, as in trace(β). Let s β be the sequence of external actions of S A 2 which we construct from s β by moving send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 , send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 before IN V (W ), which is also an external action of A, and leaving the rest of the actions in s β as it is.
In β, IN V (R), recv(v 1 ) s 1 ,r and recv(v 2 ) s 2 ,r are the only input actions at r A , therefore, s β |r A = trace(α r ). On the other hand, recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 , recv(m r 2 ) r,s 2 are the only input actions at s A 1 , therefore,
. Now, by Theorem 2.1, there exists an execution γ of A such that, s β = trace(γ) and α r = γ|r A and α S 1 = γ|S A 1 . Therefore, in γ, send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 , send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 appear before IN V (W ) (condition (i)) and since s β = trace(γ) condition (ii) holds. Conditions (iii) holds trivially.
In the following lemma we show that in any fair execution, of A, that is an extension of either execution β or execution γ, as in the preceding lemmas, R eventually returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ).
Lemma 3.4. Let ξ be a fair execution of A that is an extension of the either execution β from Lemma 3.2 or execution γ from Lemma 3.3, then R(ξ) responds with
Proof. Note that in executions β and γ, the traces trace(β)|s A 1 is a prefix of trace(γ)|s A 1 , since β ends with F 1 (β) and γ ends with F 2 (γ) Therefore, in both β and γ, the respective send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r actions have the same value for their v 1 's. Now, in any extended fair execution η of A, which starts with β or γ, by the properties N and O the transaction R completes; and by the property S, R returns (
In the following lemma, we show there exists an execution η of A of the form
Lemma 3.5. There exists a fair execution η of A that contains transactions R and W where IN V (R) appears before IN V (W ); RESP (R) appears after RESP (W ) and the following conditions hold for η:
, for some P (η) and S(η);
(ii) The actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 appear before IN V (W ) and they appear consecutively in trace(η)|r A ; (iii) action RESP (W ) occurs before F 1 (η); and
Proof. Let γ be a fair execution of A, as described in Lemma 3.3. Let γ 0 be the execution fragment of γ up to the action send(v 2 ) s 2 ,r . Now, by Theorem 2.2 (1), there exists a fair execution γ 0 • µ, of A, where µ denotes the extended portion of the execution. Clearly, by the N and O properties, the actions resp(op r 1 ) and resp(op r 2 ) must eventually occur
Note the condition (ii) is satisfied by η because RESP (W ) appears in P (η), therefore, the fair execution γ is equivalent to the execution fragment of P (η) up to the event IN V (W ), and also, γ satisfies condition (ii) as stated in Lemma 3.3. Condition (iii) is true because F 1 (η) begins with action recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 , which occurs after RESP (W ). Condition (iv) is satisfied by η because η is an extension of γ and due to the result of Lemma 3.4.
In the following theorem we prove the impossibility result for achieving the SNOW properties for the two-client system by starting with a fair execution η and creating a sequence of fair executions of A, where each one is of the form
, with progressively shorter P (·) until one of them contradicts the property S. Theorem 3.6. The SNOW properties cannot be implemented in a system with two clients and two servers, where the clients do not communicate with other clients. Proof. Consider a fair execution δ ( ) of A as in Lemma 3.5, and let P (δ ( ) ) be the execution fragment σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a , σ , where is some positive integer, and the σ i 's and a i 's denote states and actions, respectively. By Lemma 3.5,
Now, inductively we prove the existence of a finite sequence of fair executions of A-by proving the existence of one from the previous one-as
, for some positive integer f , with the following properties: (a) Each of the execution in the sequence can be written in the form
Note that there is a final execution of the form δ (f ) because of the initial values of v 0 1 and v 0 2 , and the write W . Clearly, there exists an integer k, f ≤ k < such that R(δ (k) 
, where we finally construct the execution φ of A to contradict the S property.
returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Now we start with execution δ (k+1) and construct an execution δ (k) as described in the rest of the proof. The following argument will show that R(δ (k) ) must also return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) thereby contradicting the above.
Consider the fair execution δ (k+1) of A which is of the form
The action a k+1 can occur at any of the automata r A , w A , s A 1 or s A 2 , therefore, we prove our claim by considering the following four possible cases.
Case (i) a k+1 occurs at w A : The execution fragments F 1 (δ (k+1) ) and F 2 (δ (k+1) ) do not contain any input action at s A 1 and s A 2 , respectively, and also, a k+1 does not occur at s A 1 or s A 2 . Hence, the adversary can delay the occurrence of action a k+1 , at w A , to create the finite execution
Note by Theorem 2.2 (1), there exists a fair execution δ (k) , of A, that is an extension of the above finite execution where, by the liveness property of a read transaction, R completes in δ (k) . Clearly, δ (k) can be written as (k) ), where S(δ (k) ) is the tail part of the execution resulting from the extension. At s A 1 , (k) ). 2 Therefore, in both of the above fragments, the send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r action has the same object value v 1 . But this means R returns v 1 1 as the value for o 1 and hence, by the property S, R(δ (k) ) must respond with (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). 2 We drop the superscript A, such as s A 1 to s1, from the symbol above ∼ for formatting reasons, when necessary.
Case (ii) a k+1 occurs at r A : Similar to Case (i).
Case (iii) a k+1 occurs at s A 1 : Observe that the execution fragments a k+1 σ k+1 • F 1 (δ (k+1) ) and F 2 (δ (k+1) ) occur at separate automata, i.e., at s A 1 and s A 2 , respectively. Observe that the execution fragments a k+1 σ k+1 • F 1 (δ (k+1) ) and F 2 (δ (k+1) ), of A, do not contain any input actions at s A 1 and s A 2 , respectively. Therefore, by Claim 1, we can create a fair execution , of A, which can be expressed as
). Now, since action send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r , in both F 1 ( ) and F 1 (δ (k+1) ), sends the same object value v 1 1 to r. Therefore, R returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Now let us denote the execution fragment σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a k , σ k • F 2 ( ) by , which is simply a finite prefix of . Now, suppose the adversary appends the recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 to , i.e., delivers the value request message from r to s 1 , and creates a finite execution , of A, 
Next, since F 1 ( ) and F 2 ( ) contains actions of two separate automata, therefore, by Claim 1, we can create an execution prefix (iv) 
). Next by using Theorem 2.2 (1) we create fair execution δ (k) as an extension of (iv) . Clearly, it can be written as (k) ). Then by O and N properties R completes in δ (k) . Since F 1 ( (iv) )
Case (iv) a k+1 occur at s A 2 : Since a k+1 occurs at s A 2 and F 1 (δ (k+1) ) occurs at s A 1 , (i.e., separate automata), then by applying Claim 1 as in the previous cases we can create a new fair execution of A (Figure 4 (f ) 
where a k+1 , σ k+1 occurs after F 1 (δ (k+1) ) and R( ) returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Now, consider the finite execution σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a k , σ k • F 1 ( ) for A and suppose the adversary appends the recv(m r 2 ) r,s 2 to create a finite execution of 
Now, in , we identify the fragment which begins with recv(m r 2 ) r,s 2 and end with the action send(v 2 ) s 2 ,r as F 2 ( ) to write as σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a k , σ k • F 1 ( ) • F 2 ( ). Now using Theorem 2.2 (1), we know there exists a fair execution δ (k) of A, which is an extension of . Clearly, δ (k) can be written (k) ), where S(δ (k) ) is the tail part of the extended fair execution. Clearly, k) and this implies R(δ (k) ) must return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). 
Impossibility of SNOW properties with three clients
In this section, we prove that for a three-client transaction processing system, with at least two objects, it is impossible to design an algorithm that satisfies the SNOW properties. From the proof of the SNOW Theorem [9] , it is not clear whether a write transaction is ever required to complete in the presence of ongoing read transactions (Fig. 5) . Moreover, the authors in [9] do not state explicitly whether the result of the SNOW Theorem holds if clients communicate with each other. In our proof, we state these points explicitly: each write must complete even if there are concurrent read transactions, and between every pair of processes, there are two communication channels, one in each direction (Fig 5) . Furthermore, we assume that if a read is invoked at a reader, then the reader can proceed to contact the servers without waiting for any incoming messages. We prove our result by showing a contradiction. We consider a system consisting of two servers, s 1 and s 2 , and three clients: two readers r 1 and r 2 , which initiate only read transactions, and a writer w, which initiates only write transactions. ) and read(o 2 ), respectively. As in Section 3, we assume an omniscient adversary that can control the patterns of sequences of invocations of transactions, the times of these invocations, and delays in local computation and message deliveries. In the rest of the section, in order to reduce notational clutter, for any execution of B, σ 0 , a 1 , · · · , a k , σ k · · · , where σ's and a's are states and actions, we use the notation a 1 , · · · , a k · · · that shows only the actions while leaving out the states.
Notations and Definitions:
We introduce the following notations and definitions in the context of a fair execution α, of B, with transactions R and W in it, where j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. send(m r j ) r,s j : an output action at r A , which sends a message m r j from reader r to server s j , requesting the value for o j ;
2. recv(m r j ) r,s j : an input action at s A j , that receives the message m r j , sent from r;
Non-blocking fragments
Suppose there is a fragment of execution in α where the first action is recv(m r i ) r,s i and the last action is send(v i ) s i ,r , both of which occur at s A i . Moreover, suppose there is no other input action at s A i in this fragment. Then we call this execution fragment a non-blocking response fragment for op r i at s A i . We use the notation F i (α) (v j ) to denote this fragment of execution of α (Fig. 6 ). In the context of a read R i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, we use the notation
6. Suppose read R completes in α. Consider the execution fragment in α between the event IN V (R) and whichever of the events send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 and send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 that occurs later. If all the actions in this fragment correspond to r A , then we denote this fragment as I(α) (Fig. 6) . In case of a read R i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, we use the notation I i (α) for I(α).
7. Suppose reads R completes in α. Consider the execution fragments in α that occurs between the later of the events recv(v 1 ) s 1 ,r or recv(v 2 ) s 2 ,r , i.e., at the point in α when r receives responses from both the servers, and the event RESP (R). If all the actions in this fragment occur at r A , then we denote this fragment by E(α) (v 1 ,v 2 ) , where R returns the values (v 1 , v 2 ) (Fig. 6) . In case of a read R i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, we use the notation
8. We use the notations R(α) and W (α) to denote the transactions R and W , in the context of α. When the underlying execution is clear from the context we simply use R and W .
9. For any v i j ∈ V j , the superscript i corresponds to the version identifier, which uniquely identifies a version from a totally ordered set.
Any read R initiated at a reader r, via the invocation action IN V (R) at r, after which the actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 , at r, send message m r 1 to s 1 and m r 2 to s 2 , respectively. Once s 1 receives recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 then s 1 responds to r, in a non-blocking manner, with value v 1 via action Figure 6 : The figure depicts for a fair execution α of B the relevant actions in the execution fragments of
send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r . Similarly, after s 2 receives m r 2 it responds with v 2 to r in a non-blocking manner via the action send(v 2 ) s 2 ,r . After r receives v 1 and v 2 via actions recv(v 1 ) s 1 ,r and recv(v 2 ) s 2 ,r , respectively, R completes with the response action RESP (R) and returns (v 1 , v 2 ).
From the above discussion we can state the following useful lemma, which states that in any execution of B, if a server s i responds with a value v i during a read then the read returns v i for object o i and also, the pair of values (v t 1 , v t 2 ) are from some version t. The result follows from the reliable channel model, where messages reach at their destinations unaltered; and by the S property the object values, for objects o 1 and o 2 , returned by R are of the same version.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose α is any execution of B such that a read R is in α. Suppose the execution fragment
, and s, s , t, t are version identifiers then (i) s = s and t = t and (ii) s = t . Proof. Suppose R is invoked at reader r. Then, via the action send(v t 1 ) s 1 ,r , in execution fragment
, server s 1 sends the value v t 1 to r, which is received at r through the action recv(
. By the assumptions of the reliable channel automata in our model, we have v t 1 = v t 1 , i.e., t = t . Similar argument for F 2 (α) (v s 2 ) and E(α) (v t 1 ,v s 2 ) leads us to conclude s = s . Next, R responds with (v t 1 , v s 2 ), which implies by the S property for executions of B that v t 1 and v s 2 must correspond to the same version, i.e., s = t .
Note that the above results hold even if there are any other execution fragments, that do not contain any actions at r, s 1 or s 2 , in-between the I, F i and E execution fragments. Corollary 1. Suppose α is any execution of B such that a read R is in α. Suppose the execution fragment I(α)
2 ) in α, corresponds to R, where
are some execution fragments that do not contain any action at r, s 1 or s 2 , and s, s , t, t are version identifiers then (i) s = s and t = t and (ii) s = t .
The following lemma states that new fair executions of B can be created by swapping execution fragments that have no input actions, and in which each fragment contains actions that occur only at one automaton and the automata for the two fragments are different.
Lemma 4.2 (Commuting fragments)
. Let α be a fair execution of B. Suppose G 1 (α) and G 2 (α) are any execution fragments in α such that all actions in each fragment occur only at one automaton and also, none of them are input actions. Suppose G 1 (α) and G 2 (α) occur at two distinct automata and the execution fragment G 1 (α) • G 2 (α) occurs in α. Then there exists a fair execution α of B, where the execution fragment G 2 (α) • G 1 (α) appears in α , such that (i) the prefix in α before
Proof. This is clear because the adversary can move the actions in G 2 to occur before G 1 at their respective automata, and these fragments do not contain any input actions, and hence the actions in one of these fragments cannot affect the actions in the other fragment.
The following lemma states that if there are two fair executions of B with a read R in each of them, and suppose at any server the non-blocking execution fragments of R are identical (in terms of the sequence of states and actions) then in both executions, R returns the same object value. Proof. Suppose R is invoked at some reader r. Let j ∈ {1, 2} and suppose the fragments F j (α) and F j (β) appears in α and β respectively, where in F j (α) server s j sends v j ∈ V j to r. Then R(α) must return v j for object o j by the O property of B. Then since F j (α) s j ∼ F j (β) then in F j (β) the server s j must also send v j to r, therefore, both R(α) and R(β) must return value v j for o j .
Below we show that in any finite execution of B where the final action is an invocation of read R at a reader r, the adversary can always induce a fair execution of B where the fragments I, F 1 , F 2 and E appear consecutively in that order.
Lemma 4.4. If any finite execution of B ends with IN V (R), for a read R then there exists an extension α which is a fair execution of B and is of the form P (α)
, where P (α) is the prefix and S(α) denotes the rest of the execution.
Proof. Consider a finite execution of B that end with IN V (R), which occurs at some reader r, then the adversary induces the execution fragment I(α) by delaying all actions, except the internal and output actions at r A , between the actions IN V (R) and the later of the actions send(m r 1 ) r,s 1 and send(m r 2 ) r,s 2 . Next, the adversary delivers m r 1 at s 1 (via the action recv(m r 1 ) r,s 1 ) and delays all actions, other than internal and output actions at s A 1 , until s 1 responds with v 1 , via send(v 1 ) s 1 ,r ; we identify this execution fragment as F 1 (α) (v 1 ) . Subsequently, in a similar manner, the adversary delivers the message m r 2 and delays appropriate actions to induce the execution fragment F 2 (α) (v 2 ) . Finally, the adversary delivers the values v 1 and v 2 to r (via the events Figure 7 : The sequence of fair executions of B with three clients with the operation W , R 1 and R 2 eventually leading to the execution α 1 0 that contradicts the S property. The directed arcs depicts the transposition of execution fragments from the previous execution in the sequence.
recv(v 1 ) s 1 ,r and recv(v 2 ) s 2 ,r ), and delays all actions at other automata until R completes with action RESP (R) by returning (v 1 , v 2 ). As a result, we arrive at a fair execution of B of the form
The high-level view of our proof strategy is to create a fair execution α of B that contradicts the S property. We begin with a fair execution of B that contains reads R 1 and R 2 , and write W , where R 1 begins after W completes, and R 2 begins after R 1 completes. Clearly, by the S property both R 1 and R 2 return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Then we successively create a sequence of fair executions of B (Fig. 7) , where we interchange the fragments until we finally reach an execution of where R 2 completes before R 1 begins, but R 2 returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) and R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) which contradicts the S property.
The following lemma show that in an execution of B with a write W and a read R 1 , there exists a point in the execution such that if R 1 is invoked before that point then R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and if invoked after that point then R 1 returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Lemma 4.5 (Existence of α 0 and α 1 ). There exist fair executions α 0 and α 1 of B that contain transactions W and R 1 with the following properties:
where k is some positive integer and a 1 , · · · , a k is a prefix of a 1 , · · · , a k+1 .
Proof. Now we describe the construction of a sequence {γ k } ∞ k=0 of finite executions of B such that each γ k contains W and R 1 . Let us consider a fair execution α of B that contains W . Suppose k is any positive integer and suppose R 1 is invoked at r A 1 after the execution fragment a 1 , · · · , a k+1 , a prefix of α. After the action IN V (R), the adversary schedules only internal and external actions at r A 1 until both the events send(m 2 ) r 1 ,s 2 occur, thereby creating an execution fragment of the form a 1 , · · · , a k+1 • I 1 (α). Let us denote a 1 , · · · , a k+1 by P k+1 .
Following this, the adversary delivers the messages m r 1 1 at s 1 , and delays all actions at other automata and also any input action at s 1 , until s 1 sends v 1 to r 1 , therefore, inducing the execution fragment P k+1 • I 1,1 (α) • F 1,1 (α) of B. Next, the adversary delivers m r 1 2 at s 2 and delays all actions at other automata and input actions at s 2 , until s 2 sends v 2 to r 1 . Then the adversary delivers v 1 and v 2 at r 1 but it delays actions at other automata and any other input action at r 1 , until RESP (R 1 ) occurs. Up to this point this is an execution fragment of B, which can be written as
We denote this finite execution prefix as γ k . Therefore, there exists the sequence of such finite executions {γ k } ∞ k=0 . In γ 0 , R 1 precedes W and therefore, by the S property, in γ 0 , R 1 must respond with (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ). On the other hand, if k is large enough such that a k occurs in α after the completion of W then by the S property, in γ k+1 , R 1 must return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Therefore, there exists a minimum k where in γ k read R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and in γ k+1 , R 1 returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). We identify γ k as α 0 and γ k+1 as α 1 as in claims (i) and (ii), respectively. Now, we show (iii) by eliminating the possibility of a k+1 occurring at s A 1 , s A 2 , w A or r A 2 by showing contradictions. Our proof is based on the following argument. The S property implies that R 1 must respond with values for o 1 and o 2 corresponding to the same version, which implies that s 1 and s 2 must send values of the same version. Observe that R 1 , in α 0 and α 1 , returns values for versions 0 (i.e., (v 0 1 , v 0 2 )) and 1 (i.e., (v 1 1 , v 1 2 )), respectively, but the prefixes P k and P k+1 differ from one another only by action a k+1 . But just one action at any of s 1 , s 2 , r 2 or w is not enough for s 1 and s 2 to coordinate to return values of the same version. Therefore, a k+1 must occur in r 1 , which can possibly synchronize by sending some information in m 1 and m 2 to s 1 and s 2 , respectively.
Case a k+1 occurs at s A 1 : Consider the prefix of execution α 0 up to the action a k . Suppose the adversary invokes R 1 immediately after action a k , i.e., via IN V (R 1 ). By Lemma 4.4 there exists fair execution α of B that contains an execution fragment of the form
. Note that in both α and α 1 we can have I 1 (α 1 )
, this is because in both executions the actions of I 1 occur entirely at r 1 and those of F 1,2 entirely at s 2 . As a result, F 1,2 (α ) must send the same value v 1 2 for o 2 to r 1 as in F 1,2 (α 1 ). Then in α , by Lemma 4.3, R 1 (α ) returns v 1 2 for object o 2 , and by the S property, R 1 (α ) returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). But this contradicts the definition of k, as the minimum value of k such that R 1 responds with (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ). Case a k+1 occurs at s A 2 : A contradiction can be shown by following a line of reasoning similar to the preceding case.
Case a k+1 occurs at w A : This can be argued in a similar manner as the previous case and a bit easier because we have F 1,1 (α 1 )
Case a k+1 occurs at r A 2 : A contradiction can be derived using a line of reasoning as in the previous case.
From the above, we conclude that in α 1 , action a k+1 must occur at r A 1 .
Additional notation: In the remainder of the section, for the execution fragments I i (α),
and S(α), for i ∈ {1, 2} we use the notations
and S, respectively, suppressing the explicit reference to the execution. With regard to any read R i if it has an execution fragment of the form
. Also, wherever the returned values in the fragments are not known, clear from the context or irrelevant we omit them. In the rest of the section, we fix α 0 and α 1 , and the value of k; we denote the execution fragments a 1 , · · · , a k and a 1 , · · · , a k+1 as P k and P k+1 , respectively, which are the same irrespective of the execution they appear in.
The following lemma states the existence of an execution of B where, following a write, there are two consecutive reads and both return the object values updated by the write. Lemma 4.6 (Existence of α 2 ). There exists fair execution α 2 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form
• S, where both R 1 and R 2 return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Proof. We can construct a fair execution α 2 of B as follows. Consider the prefix
2 ) of the execution α 1 , from Lemma 4.5. At the end of this prefix, the adversary invokes R 2 . Now, by Lemma 4.4, due to IN V (R 2 ) there is an extension of the prefix of the form
. By the S property, we have v 1 = v 1 1 and v 2 = v 1 2 . Therefore, α 2 ( Fig. 7) can be written in the form
• S, where S is the rest of the execution.
Based on the previous execution, the following lemma states that there is a fair execution of B where the I 2 occurs earlier than the action a k+1 and invocation of R 1 .
Lemma 4.7 (Existence of α 3 ). There exists fair execution α 3 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 , and can be written in the form
Proof. Consider the execution α 2 as in Lemma 4.6. In the execution fragment
in α 2 , none of the actions occur at r 2 and by Lemma 4.5, a k+1 occurs at r A 1 , also the actions in I 2 occur only at r 2 . Starting with α 2 , and by repeatedly using Lemma 4.2, we create a sequence of four fair executions of B by repeatedly swapping I 2 with the execution fragments E
and I 1 , which appears in
• I 2 , where the following sequence of execution
(by commuting I 2 and E
(by commuting I 2 and F (v 1 1 )
1,1 ) appear. Finally, we have an execution α of the form
• S (by commuting I 2 and I 1 ) Next, from α , by using Lemma 4.2 and swapping a k+1 with I 2 we show the existence of a fair execution α 3 as stated in the lemma.
In the following lemma, we show that we can create a fair execution α 4 , of B, where F 2,2 occurs immediately before E 
Next, we create a new fair execution α 5 of B where F 2,2 occurs before F 1,2 . However, because the actions in both of these execution fragments occur at the same automaton care has to be taken to swap these fragments compared to α 4 . Lemma 4.9 (Existence of α 5 ). There exists fair execution α 4 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form 2 ) r 2 ,s 2 ) and delays all actions, other than internal and output actions at s A 2 , until s 2 responds with v 2 , via action send(v 2 ) s 2 ,r 2 . This extended execution fragment is of the form F 2,2 . Similarly, the adversary further extends the execution by placing the action recv(m r 1 2 ) r 1 ,s 2 at s 2 and create the execution fragment of form F 1,2 . Note that, so far, the actions due to the above extensions are entirely at s 2 . Suppose the adversary makes the execution fragments E 1 next, by delivering values sent during F 1,1 and F 1,2 via the actions recv(v 1 ) s 1 ,r 1 and recv(v 2 ) s 2 ,r 1 , respectively, at r 1 . Then F 2,1 appear next, such that this fragment contains exactly the same sequence of actions as in the corresponding execution fragment in α 4 . This is possible because they are not influenced by any output action in F 2,2 or F 1,2 . Suppose the adversary places the execution fragment E 2 next. Let us denote the fair execution that is a extension of this finite execution so far as α 5 , which is of the form
• S. Now we need to argue about the values returned by the reads.
Note that the execution fragment F 1,1 (α 4 ) in both α 4 and α 5 is the same, therefore, F 1,1 (α 4 )
Hence as in α 4 , s 1 returns v 1 1 in the execution fragment F 1,1 in α 5 . Next by Lemma 4.3 for R 1 , s 2 returns v 1 2 in F 1,2 and hence by the S property, R 1 (α 5 ) returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ), i.e., that r 1 returns the new version of object values. Therefore, F 1,1 (α 4 ), F 1,2 and E 1 are of the form F
, respectively. Note that by construction of α 5 above, the execution fragment F 2,1 in both α 4 and α 5 is the same, therefore, F 2,1 (α 4 ) From the above argument we know that α 5 is of the form
In the next lemma, we show the existence of a fair execution of B where R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and I 2 occurs immediately after a k and R 2 responds with (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). In fact, this is the most important of the sequence of fair executions of B (Fig. 7) because later with this we prove in Theorem 4.15 the existence of a fair execution of B where a read returns object-values of an earlier version compared to a previous read that is not concurrent with it.
Lemma 4.10 (Existence of α 6 ). There exists fair execution α 6 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form
The crucial part of this proof is to carefully use the result of Lemma 4.5 so that R 1 returns
. Note that by the construction of α 5 , as in Lemma 4.9, the same prefix P k appears in the fair executions α 5 , and the executions α 0 and α 1 as in Lemma 4.5, where k is defined as in Lemma 4.5. Note that by Lemma 4.5, action a k+1 occurs at r A 1 . In α 5 , in the execution fragment a k+1
2,2 , the actions in execution fragment a k+1 •I 1 occur at r A 1 ; actions in F
2,2 occur at s A 2 . Now consider the prefix of execution α 4 ending with I 2 and suppose the adversary invokes R 1 immediately after I 2 (instead of after a k+1 ) and extends by the execution fragment I 1 • F 1,1 • F 2,2 to create a new finite execution , which is of the form
Note that as a result, a k+1 may not be in because we are introducing changes before a k+1 can occur.
Note that if in the prefix
( ) of we ignore the actions in I 2 ( ) then the remaining execution is the same as the prefix
Here we explicitly use the notations and α 0 to avoid confusion. Since the actions in I 2 ( ) have no influence in the actions on
, and hence by Lemma 4.1 F 1,1 ( ) returns v 0 1 as in F 1,1 (α), i.e., in F 1,1 , s 1 returns v 0 1 . Now by Lemma 4.3 we conclude that for any extension of , say γ, read R 1 (γ) returns v 0 1 for object o 1 and by the S property
∼ F 2,2 (γ) by Lemma 4.3 and the S property, R 2 (γ) must return (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). Therefore, γ has an extension to a fair execution α 6 (Fig. 7 ) which is of the form
• S as in the statement of the lemma.
In the following lemma, starting from α 6 in Lemma 4.10 we create a fair execution α 7 for B where F 2,1 appears before F 1,2 • E 1 , where R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and R 2 returns (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ). At high level, we will be working on moving the execution fragments of R 2 forward, a little at a time, until finally we have R 2 finishing before R 1 starts. This simply uses commutativity since the actions in the swapped execution fragments occurs at different automata.
Lemma 4.11 (Existence of α 7 ). There exists fair execution α 7 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 , and can be written in the form
Proof. This result is proved by applying the result of Lemma 4.2 to the fair execution created in Lemma 4.10. Suppose, α 6 (Fig. 7) is a fair execution as in Lemma 4.10, where in the execution fragment E
1,2 as G 2 . The actions of G 1 and G 2 occur at two distinct automata, therefore, we can use the result of Lemma 4.2, to argue that there exists a fair execution α of B that contains the execution fragment
, and α 6 and α are identical in the prefixes and suffixes corresponding to G 1 and G 2 . Now, α contains F 1,2 • F 2,1 , where the actions in F 1,2 (identified as G 1 ) and F 2,1 (identify as G 2 ) occur at distinct automata. Hence, by Lemma 4.2 there exists an execution α 7 of the form
In the following lemma by using simple commuting arguments of Lemma 4.2, we show the existence of a fair execution α 7 of B where F 2,2 appears before
Lemma 4.12 (Existence of α 8 ). There exists fair execution α 8 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form
Proof. Consider the fair execution α 7 of B as in Lemma 4.11. In the context of of Lemma 4.2, in α 7 (Fig. 7 ) the actions in F 1,1 (identify as G 1 ) occur at s A 1 and those in F 2,2 (identify as G 2 ) at s A 2 . Then by Lemma 4.2 there exists a fair execution α of B, of the form (Fig. 7) in the form as stated in the lemma.
The following lemma shows the existence of a fair execution of B, α 9 , where we move F 2,1 forward past F 1,1 . Lemma 4.13 (Existence of α 9 ). There exists fair execution α 9 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form
Proof. In α 8 from Lemma 4.12, all the actions in I 1 occur at r 1 ; those in F 1,1 occur at s 1 ; and the actions in F 2,1 occur only at s 1 . Note that actions of both execution fragments F 2,1 and F 1,1 occur at r 1 . Consider the prefix of α 8 that ends with I 1 then suppose the adversary extends this prefix by adding an execution fragment of the form F 2,1 • F 1,1 as follows. First note that the actions send(m 1 ) r 2 ,s 1 , and allows an execution fragment of the form F 2,1 to appear. Now, immediately after this the adversary further extends it with an execution fragment of the form F 1,1 by placing action recv(m r 1 1 ) r 1 ,s 1 . Next the fragment F 1,2 is added and is the same as F 1,2 (α 8 ). This last step can be argued by the fact that none of the actions in F 1,2 can be affected by any of the output actions at F 2,1 and F 1,1 . Note that the actions in F 1,2 are taking place at s 2 , which is not affected by the above fragments, and therefore, at the end of this fragment s 2 returns v 0 1 , as in α 8 . But by S property F 1,1 has to return v 0 1 as well. Note that a careful argument can be done by using Theorem 2.3 to conclude the same. Following this the adversary allows the rest of the execution by adding an execution fragment of the form E 1 • E 2 • S. The resulting fair execution is of the form Lemma 4.14 (Existence of α 10 ). There exists fair execution α 10 of B that contains transactions W , R 1 and R 2 and can be written in the form
Proof. Now, by using Lemma 4.2 to α 9 , we can interchange F 2,1 and I 1 to create a fair execution α 10
( Fig. 7) of B, which is of the form
• S, where the returned values are determined by Lemma 4.1.
Note that in the execution fragment none of the actions in the execution fragment
each of the action occur at r A 2 . Therefore, by applying Lemma 4.2, we can consecutively swap E 2 with E 1 , F 1,2 , I 1 and F 1,1 we create a sequence of four fair executions of B to arrive at fair execution α 10 ( Fig. 7 ) of the form
The following statement proves the statement of the SNOW Theorem by showing the existence of fair execution α 10 , of B, where R 2 completes before R 1 is invoked and R 2 completes by returning (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) whereas R 1 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ), which violates the S property in α 10 .
Theorem 4.15. The SNOW properties cannot be implemented in a system with two readers and one writer, for two servers even in the presence of client-to-client communication.
Proof. Note that in α 10 , R 2 completes by returning (v 1 1 , v 1 2 ) and R 1 , although invoked after R 2 returns (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ), is initiated and as a result α 10 violates the S property.
Condition for proving strict serializability
In this section, we derive a useful property for executions of algorithms that implement objects of data type O T that will later help us show the strict serializability property (S property) of algorithms presented in later sections. Although the strict serializability property in transaction-processing systems is a well-studied topic, the specific setting considered in this paper is much simpler. Therefore, this allows us to derive simpler conditions to prove the safety of these algorithms. A wide range of transaction types and transaction processing systems are considered in the literature. For example, in [13] , Papadimitriou defined the strict serializability conditions as a part of developing a theory for analyzing transaction processing systems. In this work, each transaction T consists of a set of write operations W , at individual objects, and a set of read operations R from individual objects, where the operations in W must complete before the operations in R execute. Other types of transaction processing systems allow nested transactions [4, 8, 11] , where the transactions may contain sub-transactions [2] which may further contain a mix of read or write operations, or even child-transactions. In most transaction processing systems considered in the literature, transactions can be aborted so as to handle failed transactions. As a result, the serializability theories are developed while considering the presence of aborts. However, in our system, we do not consider any abort, nor any client or server failures. A transaction in our system is either a set of independent writes or a set of reads (see Section 2.2) with all the reads or writes in a transaction operating on different objects. Such simplifications allow us to formulate an equivalent condition for the execution of an algorithm to prove the S property of such algorithms while implementing an object of data type O T .
We note that an execution of a variable of type O T is a finite sequence 
is consistent with the f function for an object of type O T (see Section 5) . Now, the safety property of such an object is a trace that describes the correct response to a sequence of IN V s when all the transactions are executed sequentially. The strict serializability of O T says that each trace produced by an execution of O T with concurrent transactions appears as some trace of O T . We describe this below in more detail.
Definition 2 (Strict-serializability). Let us consider an execution β of an object of type O T , such that the invocations of any transaction at any client respects the well-formedness property. Let Π denote the set of complete transactions in β then we say β satisfies the strict-serializability property for O T if the following are possible:
(i) For every complete read or write transaction π we insert a point (serialization point) π * between the actions IN V (π) and RESP (π).
(ii) We select a set Φ of incomplete transactions in β such that for each π ∈ Φ we select a response RESP (π).
(iii) For each π ∈ Φ we insert π * somewhere after IN V (π) in β, and remove the IN V for the rest of the incomplete transactions in β.
(iv) If we assume for each π ∈ Π ∪ Φ both IN V (π) and RESP (π) to occur consecutively at π * , with the interval of the transaction shrunk to π * , then the sequence of transactions in this new trace is a trace of an object of data type O T . Now, we consider any automaton B that implements an object of type O T , and prove a result that serves us an equivalent condition for proving the strict serializability property of B. Any trace property P of an automaton is a safety property if the set of executions in P is non-empty; prefix-closed, meaning any prefix of an execution in P is also in P ; and limit-closed, i.e., if β 1 , β 2 , · · · is any infinite sequence of executions in P is such that β i is prefix of β i+1 for any i, then the limit β of the sequence of executions {β i } ∞ i=0 is also in P . From Theorem 13.1 in [10] , we know that the trace property, which we denote by P SC , of any well-formed execution of B that satisfies the strict-serializability property is a safety property. Moreover, from Lemma 13.10 in [10] we can deduce that if every execution of B that is well-formed and failure-free, and also contains no incomplete transactions, satisfies P SC , then any well-formed execution of B that can possibly have incomplete transactions is also in P SC . Therefore, in the following lemma, which gives us an equivalent condition for the strict serializability property of an execution β, we consider only executions without any incomplete transactions. The lemma is proved in a manner similar to Lemma 13.16 in [10] , for atomicity guarantee of a single multi-reader multi-writer object.
Lemma 5.1. Let β be an execution (finite or infinite) of an automaton B that implements an object of type O T , which consists of a set of k sub-objects. Suppose all clients in β behave in an well-formed manner. Suppose β contains no incomplete transactions and let Π be the set of transactions in β. Suppose there exists an irreflexive partial ordering (≺) among the transactions in Π, such that, P 1 For any transaction π ∈ Π there are only a finite number of transactions φ ∈ Π such that φ ≺ π; P 2 If the response event for π precedes the invocation event for φ in β, then it cannot be that φ ≺ π; P 3 If π is a write transaction in π and φ is any transaction in Π, then either π ≺ φ or φ ≺ π; and Then execution β is strictly serializable.
Proof. We discuss how to insert a serialization point * π in β for every transaction π ∈ Π. First, we add * π immediately after the latest of the invocations of π or φ ∈ Π such that φ ≺ π. Note that according to condition P 1 for π there are only finite number of such invocations in β, therefore, π * is well-defined. Now, since the order of the invocation events of the transactions in Π are already defined the order of the corresponding set of serialization points are well-defined except for the case when more than one serialization points are placed immediately after an invocation. In the case such multiple serialization points corresponding to an invocation we order order these serialization points in accordance with the ≺ relation of the underlying transactions.
Next, we show that for any pair of transactions φ, π ∈ Π if φ ≺ π then * φ precedes * π . Suppose φ ≺ π. By construction, each of π * and φ * appear immediately after some invocation of some transaction in Π. If both π * and φ * appear immediately after the same invocation, then since φ ≺ π, by construction of π * , π * is ordered after φ * . Also, if the invocations after which π * and φ * appear are distinct, then by construction of π * , π * appear after φ * since φ ≺ π.
Next we argue that each * π serialization point for any π ∈ Π is placed between the invocation IN V (π) and responses RESP (π). By construction, * π is after IN V (π). To show that * π is before RESP (π) for the sake of contradiction assume that * π appears after RESP (π). By construction, * π must be after IN V (φ) for some φ ∈ Π and φ = π, they by the condition of construction of π * we have φ ≺ π. But from above IN V (φ) occurs after RESP (π), i.e., π completes before φ in invoked which means, by property P 2, we cannot have φ ≺ π, a contradiction. Next, we show that if we were to shrink the transactions intervals to their corresponding serialization points, the resulting trace would be a trace of the underlying data type O T . In other words, we show any read READ(
, was written by the immediately preceding (w.r.t. the serialization points) write that contained write(o i j , v i j ) or the initial values if no such previous write exists. Let us denote the set of writes that precedes (w.r.t. ≺) π by Π ≺π W , i.e., φ ∈ Π ≺π W φ is a write and φ ≺ π. By property P 3, all transactions in Π ≺π W are totally-ordered. By property P 4, v i j must be the value updated by the most recent write in Π ≺π W . Since the total order of serialization points are consistent with ≺ and hence the v i j corresponds to the write operation of a write transaction with the most recent serialization point and contains a operation of type write(o i j , * ).
SNOW on MWSR with client-to-client messages
In this section, we present algorithm A for transaction processing in the multiple-writers singlereader (MWSR) setting, and prove that any fair and well-formed execution of A satisfies the SNOW properties. In practice, a system with a single reader may not be very useful but this algorithm serves as counter example algorithm to exhibit the point that if client-to-client communication is allowed it is still possible to implement the SNOW properties. Algorithm A shows that if client-to-client messaging is allowed, it is possible to have algorithms for transaction processing with two clients that satisfies the SNOW properties. We consider a system where there are ≥ 1 writers with ids w 1 , w 2 · · · w (we denoted this set by W), one reader with id r, and k ≥ 1 servers with ids s 1 , s 2 · · · s k (denote as S) that maintains the objects o 1 , · · · , o k , respectively. We assume writers can send messages to the reader, and the reader can respond back to the writers, i.e., we allow client-to-client messages. Note that for a two-client system, when both clients are of the same type, i.e., two writers or two reads, the SNOW properties are trivially satisfied.
The steps of algorithm A are presented in Fig.4 . We assume that each of the processes are run in a single-threaded manner, and therefore, each of the servers or the clients executes the algorithmic steps sequentially. For uniquely identifying a write transaction we use keys in algorithm A. A key κ is defined as a pair (z, w), where z ∈ N and w ∈ W the id of a writer. We use K to denote the set of all possible keys. Also, with each transaction we associate a tag t ∈ N, which will help us define an order among the transactions.
State Variables: The state variables in writer, reader and server processes are as follows. (i) Any writer w has a counter z to keep track of the number of write transactions it has invoked so far, initially 0. (ii) The reader r has an ordered list List of elements as (κ, (b 1 
, where κ 0 ≡ (0, w 0 ), where w 0 is any place holder identifier string for writer id. The List can be though of as an array, with 0 as the starting index. (iii) Each server s i ∈ S there is a set variable V als with elements that are key-value pairs (κ,
, for a write transaction, can be invoked at any writer w, where I = {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i p } is any subset of p indices of [k] . We define the set S I {s i 1 , s i 2 , · · · , s ip }. This procedure consists of two consecutive phases: write-value and inform-reader. In the write-value phase, w creates a key κ as κ ≡ (z + 1, w); and also increments the local counter z by one. Then it sends (write-value, (κ, v i )) to each server s i in S I , and awaits acknowledges from each server in S I . After receiving acknowledges from each server in S I , w initiates the inform-reader phase during which it sends (inform-reader, (κ, (b 1 , · · · b k )) to r, where for any i ∈ [k] , b i is a boolean variable, such that b i = 1 if s i ∈ S I , otherwise b i = 0. Essentially, such a (k + 1)-tuple identifies the set of objects that are updated during that write transaction, i.e., if b i = 1 then object o i was updated during the execution of the write transaction, otherwise b i = 0. After w receives acknowledge from r it completes the write.
Reader steps: Note that we use the same notations for I and S I as above for the set of indices and corresponding servers, possibly different across transactions. The procedure READ(o i 1 , o i 2 , · · · , o ip ), for any read transaction, is initiated at reader r, where o i 1 , o i 2 , · · · , o ip denotes the subset of objects r intends to read. This procedure consists of only one phase, read-value, of communication between the reader and the servers in S I . Here r sends the message (read-value, κ i ) to each server s i ∈ S I , where the κ i is the key in the tuple (κ i , (b 1 , · · · , b k )) in List located at index j * such that b i = 1 such that i ∈ I. After receiving the values v i 1 , v i 2 , · · · v ip from all servers in S I , where
Next, if reader r receives a message (inform-reader, (κ, (b 1 , · · · , b k )) from any writer w, then r appends (κ, (b 1 , · · · , b k ) to its List, and responds to w with acknowledge and t w = |List|, i.e., number of elements in list List. The order of the elements in List corresponds to the order the write transactions, the order of the incoming inform-reader updates, as seen by the reader.
Server steps: The server protocol consists of two procedures corresponding to the messages containing the tags write-value and read-value. The first procedure is used if a server s i receives a message (write-value, (κ, v i )) from a writer w, it adds (κ, v i ) to its set variable V als and sends acknowledge back to w. The second procedure is used if s i receives a message such as (read-value, κ i ) from r then it responds back with v i such that the pair (κ i , v i ) is in its variable V als.
The following result states that algorithm A respects SNOW properties. Note that the liveness property of read and write transactions are a part of the SNOW properties. Consider any failurefree execution of algorithm A. In the steps for the reader assume the quantity t r max 1≤j≤|List| {j :
which is presented as a comment in the pseudo-code for A. We associate with any transaction φ a tag tag(φ) such that if φ is a write tag(φ) = t w , i.e., the value of t w before the completion of the operation, and tag(φ) = t r when φ is a read. Theorem 6.1. Any well-formed and fair execution of algorithm A is an wait-free implementation of transaction processing in the MWSR setting with for objects of type O T , consisting of objects o 1 , o 2 , · · · o k maintained by the servers s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s k , respectively; and it respects the SNOW properties and writes transactions are live.
Proof. Below we show that A satisfies the SNOW properties. S property: Let β be any fair execution of A and suppose all clients in β behave in an well-formed manner. Suppose β contains no incomplete transactions and let Π be the set of transactions in β. We define an irreflexive partial ordering (≺) among the transactions in Π as follows: if φ and π are any two distinct transactions in Π then we say φ ≺ π if either (i) tag(φ) < tag(π) or (ii) tag(φ) = tag(π) and φ is a write and π is a read. We will prove the S (strict-serializability) property of A by proving that the properties P 1, P 2, P 3 and P 4 of Lemma 5.1 hold for β.
P1: If π is a read then since all reads are invoked by a single reader r and in a well-formed manner, therefore, there cannot be an infinite number of reads such that they all precede π (w.r.t ≺). Now, suppose π is a write. Clearly, from an inspection of the algorithm, tag(π) ∈ N. From inspection of the algorithm, each write increases the size of List, and the value of the tags are defined by the size of List. Therefore, there can be at most a finite number of writes such that can precede π (w.r.t. ≺) in β.
P2: Suppose φ and π are any two transactions in Π, such that, π begins after φ completes. Fig. 4 The protocol for a writer w, reader r and server s i for algorithm A. κ ← (z + 1, w); z ← z + 1 4:
I {i1, i2, · · · , ip} for i ∈ I do 6:
Send write-value, (κ, vs i ) to si Await acknowledge from si for every i ∈ I. Then we show that we cannot have π ≺ φ. Now, we consider four cases, depending on whether φ and π are reads or writes.
(a) φ and π are writes invoked by writers w φ and w π , respectively. Since the size of List, in r, grows monotonically with each write hence w π receives the tag at least as high as tag(φ), so π ≺ φ.
(b) φ is a write, π is a read transactions invoked by writer w φ and r, respectively. Since the size of List, in r, grows monotonically, and because w π invokes π after φ completes hence tag(π) is at least as high as tag(φ), so π ≺ φ.
(c) φ and π are reads invoked by reader r. Since the size of List, in r, grows monotonically, hence w π invoked π after φ completes hence tag(π) is at least as high as tag(φ), so π ≺ φ.
(d) φ is a read, π is a write invoked by reader r and w π , respectively. This case is simple because new values are added to List only by writers, and tag(π) is at least as large as the tag of φ and hence π ≺ φ.
P3: This is clear by the fact that any write transaction always creates a unique tag and all tags are totally ordered since they all belong to N P4: Consider a read ρ as READ(o i 1 , o i 2 , · · · , o iq ), in β. Let the returned value from ρ be v ≡(v i 1 , v i 2 , · · · , v iq ) such that 1 ≤ i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i q ≤ k, where value v i j corresponds to o i j . Suppose tag(ρ) ∈ N was created during some write transaction, say φ, i.e., φ is the write that added the elements in index (tag(ρ) − 1) of List. Note that element in index 0 contains the initial value. Now we consider two cases:
Case tag(ρ) = 1. We know that it corresponds the initial default value v 0 i at each sub-object o i , and this equates to ρ returning the default initial value for each sub-object.
Case tag(ρ) > 1. Then we argue that there exists no write transaction, say π, that updated object o i j , in β, such that, π = φ and ρ returns values written by π and φ ≺ π ≺ ρ. Suppose we assume the contrary, which means tag(φ) < tag(π) < tag(ρ). The latter implies tag(φ) = tag(π) which is not possible because this contradicts the fact that for any two distinct writes tag(φ) = tag(π) in any execution of A. N property: By inspection of algorithm A for the response steps of the servers to the reader. O property: By inspection of the read-value phase: it consists of one round of communication between the reader and the servers, where the servers send only one version of the value of the object it maintains. W property: By inspection of the write transaction steps, and and that writers always get to complete the transactions they invoke.
Note that the above theorem holds in the presence of any writer crashes.
SNoW for MWMR setting
In this section, we present algorithm B for transaction processing in the multiple-writers multi-reader (MWMR) setting and show that its execution satisfies SNoW properties, where "o" means a read may consist of more than one round trip of communications between the reader and the servers. We denote the type of object that satisfies the SNoW properties byÕ T . The steps of the algorithm for the writers, readers and the servers are presented in Fig.5 . We assume there is a set of writers W, a set of readers R and a set of k ≥ 1 servers, S, with ids s 1 , s 2 · · · s k that stores the objects o 1 , o 2 , · · · , o k , respectively. We define key κ is defined as a pair (z, w), where z ∈ N and w ∈ W the id of a writer. We use K to denote the set of all possible keys. Like in algorithm A from Section 6, also in B, the keys are used to uniquely identify each transaction. Also, with each transaction we associate a tag t ∈ N.
In algorithm B, we designate one of the servers as the coordinator, we denote as s * , for the transactions. Essentially, the coordinator s * is used to maintain the order of the writes and the objects that are updated during the write in the variable List. Note that in a system, where there are many objects different objects may be use different servers as coordinators based on some load-balancing rule.
State Variables: Each of the writers and servers maintain a set of state variables as follows: (i) At any writer w, there is a counter z to keep track of the number of write transaction the writer has invoked, initially 0. (ii) At any server, s i , for i ∈ [k] , there is a set variable V als with elements that are key-value pairs (κ, v i ) ∈ K × V i . Initially, V als = {(κ 0 , v 0 i )}. A server also contains an ordered list variable List of elements as (κ, (b 1 , · · · , b k )), where κ ∈ K and (b 1 , · · · b k ) ∈ {0, 1} k . Fig. 5 The protocol for any writer w, reader r or server s i for algorithm B. Fig. 6 The protocol for any writer w, reader r or server s i for algorithm B.
then r returns the values v i 1 , v i 2 , · · · v ip such that (κ j , v j ) ∈ V als j , j ∈ {1, · · · p}, and completes the read.
Server steps: When a server s i receives a message of type (write-value, (κ, v i )) from a writer w; or if the coordinator s * , receives (update-coord, (κ, (b 1 , · · · , b k )) from writer w or receives a message as get-tag-array from r the steps are similar to their counterparts in algorithm B. Therefore, we omit them. On the other hand, if any server s i receives a message (read-values) from a reader r then it responds to r with the entire set of values, i.e., V als.
Note the the following result states that algorithm C respects SNōW property. Consider any failure-free and fair execution of algorithm C. For the purpose of proving the S property, for every transaction transaction φ in an execution of C we associate a tag tag(φ) as described below. If φ is a write (read) then tag(φ) is the value of the variable t w (t r ) immediately before the operation completes.
Theorem 8.1. Any well-formed and fair execution of algorithm C is an implementation of an object of typeŌ T in the MWMR setting, with no client-to-client communication, comprising of objects o 1 , o 2 , · · · o k stored in servers s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s k , respectively; and it satisfies the SNōW properties.
Proof. Below we show that algorithm C satisfies the SNōW properties. S property: Let β be any fair execution of B and suppose all clients in β behave in an well-formed manner. Suppose β contains no incomplete transactions and let Π be the set of transactions in β. We define an irreflexive partial ordering (≺) in Π as follows: if φ and π are any two distinct transactions in Π then we say φ ≺ π if either (i) tag(φ) < tag(π) or (ii) tag(φ) = tag(π) and φ is a write and π is a read. Below we prove the S property of B by showing that properties P 1, P 2, P 3 and P 4 of Lemma 5.1 hold for β. The properties P 1-P 4 can be proved to hold in a manner very similar to algorithm B (Section 7). Therefore, we avoid repeating them. N,ō and W properties: Evident from an inspection of the algorithm.
